A federal judge in in Massachusetts stopped the Trump administration’s effort to terminate parole for those granted that status under the Parole Process for Cubans, Haitians, Nicaraguans, and Venezuelans (CHNV Parole Program). Svitlana Doe et al. v. Kristi Noem et al., Case No. 1:25-cv-10495-IT, (D. Mass, April 14, 2025). The judge certified a class of CHNV parolees and stayed implementation of the administration’s notice in the Federal Register (FRN), Termination of Parole Processes for Cubans, Haitians, Nicaraguans, and Venezuelans, 90 Fed. Reg. 13611 (Mar. 25, 2025) as well as all individual parole termination notices sent to grantees via their MyUSCIS accounts. Together, the FRN and notices sent to parolees purported to categorically terminate all paroles issued under that program.

Summary of Facts and Procedural History

During the Biden administration, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) implemented several parole programs, known collectively as the CHNV Parole Program, ostensibly to encourage “lawful, safe, and orderly means of traveling to the United States,” for citizens of those countries fleeing humanitarian crises. On March 25, 2025, DHS published the FRN announcing that, effective immediately, DHS was terminating the CHNV Parole Program. The FRN further announced that the paroles of individuals granted parole under the CHNV Parole Program would be terminated on April 24, 2025, if they had not already expired by that date. The notice directed that “[p]arolees without a lawful basis to remain in the United States following this termination of the [CHNV Parole Program] must depart the United States before their parole termination date,” and indicated the agency’s intention to commence enforcement actions against parolees who did not depart within the period provided. As part of a broader class action lawsuit challenging the Trump administration’s actions dismantling a number of Biden-era parole programs, several parolees brought an emergency motion for a stay of the FRN and individual parole terminations.

Analysis and Holdings

Standing

The court first found that the plaintiffs have standing due to their likely concrete injury, which the court could redress in its orders. It found that the “immediate impact of shortening [plaintiffs’] grant of parole is to cause their lawful status in the United States to lapse early – in less than two weeks…[presenting plaintiffs with] two unfavorable options: continue following the law and leave the country on their own, or await removal proceedings.” Leaving might expose plaintiffs to, among other things, dangers in their home countries and family separation. Staying would expose plaintiffs to arrest and detention and the inability to work legally. They would also be unable to seek further immigration relief under the administration’s restrictive policies regarding CHNV parolees. For these reasons, the court found plaintiffs to have standing.

Reviewability Under 8 USC § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) and the Administrative Procedures Act

The court next rejected the government’s argument that its decisions to terminate the CHNV Parole Program through the FRN and notices to individuals’ MyUSCIS accounts are not reviewable by courts under 8 USC § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), which prohibits judicial review of certain decisions left to the discretion of DHS. The court found that DHS’s decision to categorically terminate grants of parole, without any individual review, is not within DHS’s discretion under the statute. While the court agreed with DHS that individual determinations to terminate parole are left to DHS’s discretion, “en masse” terminations as purported by the FRN are not specified under the statute to be in the agency’s discretion. Just as INA § 212(d)(5)(A) requires grants of parole to be made on a case-by-case basis, “the statute requires that to determine whether the purposes of a grant of parole ‘have been served’ such that termination is warranted,” requires DHS to make individualized determinations. The court found that decisions must be clearly designated as discretionary by Congress, not simply “declared discretionary” by the administration and that the language of Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) does not suggest any clear legislative intent to preclude judicial review. Finally, the court found that DHS’s creation of the CHNV Parole Programs, which conferred affirmative immigration relief and related benefits, including lawful entry and employment authorization, was an “action that provides a focus for judicial review,” under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA).

Class Certification

The court next certified a class of plaintiffs that consisted of those individuals who have received a grant of parole under the CHNV Parole Program whose paroles are subject to termination under the FRN, except those who voluntarily left the United States prior to the FRN or those who opt out of the class. In doing so, the court found that the class met the requirements under the federal class action rules (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and (b)(2)): (1) the class of plaintiffs is numerous, including several hundred thousand members; (2) there are common issues of law and fact, as the categorical termination was made on the same terms for each member; (3) the claims of the named plaintiffs are typical of the claims of the class, as they all advance similar arguments as to why the termination of their paroles was unlawful; (4) the interests of the named plaintiffs do not conflict with those of the class; (5) the attorneys representing the class are qualified, experienced, and able to “vigorously conduct the proposed litigation;” and (6) a stay of the FRN would address each of the plaintiffs’ injuries similarly.

Stay of the FRN and Individual Notices

Finally, the court addressed whether it should order a stay of the FRN and individual notices terminating the paroles of class members pending litigation. In order to issue a stay, a court has to weigh four factors: (1) whether there is a strong showing that the plaintiff is likely to succeed on the merits, (2) whether the plaintiff will be irreparably harmed absent a stay, (3) whether issuance of the stay will substantially injury the other parties interested in the proceeding, and (4) where the public interest lies.

The court found that the plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits of their case because DHS’s decision to categorically terminate paroles granted under the CHNV Parole Program was made in legal error and without sufficient justification. The court suggested first that individuals who enter on a pre-authorized parole such as the ones granted under the CHNV Parole Program are not subject to expedited removal, even within two years of their arrival, because they are “authorized to enter the United States.” This would make DHS’s claim in the FRN legally erroneous that it had to terminate CHNV paroles within weeks in order to remove CHNV parolees via expedited removal. The court further found DHS’s reasoning in the FRN legally erroneous due to its inconsistency with DHS’s position in the litigation: on the one hand, the FRN explained that immediate termination of CHNV paroles was necessary in order to preserve the government’s ability to expeditiously remove parolees before their accrual of two years of physical presence, at which time they’d no longer be subject to expedited removal under INA § 235(b)(1)(A)(i) and (iii); on the other hand, the plaintiffs won’t succeed on their claims because CHNV parolees will in any event be subject to expedited removal as “arriving aliens” under INA § 235(b)(1)(A)(i) even beyond two years of physical presence.

In addition to finding DHS’s positions regarding the need to terminate the CHNV Parole Program legally erroneous, the court also found that DHS, after acknowledging plaintiffs’ reliance interests in maintaining their CHNV paroles, lacked a rational basis for terminating those paroles. While DHS argued that neither urgent humanitarian reasons nor significant public benefit warranted the continuation of the paroles issued under the CHNV Parole Program, the court noted that the FRN did not address “any of the humanitarian reasons underlying the creation of the CHNV programs and ignore[d] that, under the CHNV programs ‘case-by-case temporary parole’ was being used to address the relevant humanitarian concerns.” The court stated that, “[g]iven the significant reliance interests at stake – which the FRN recognized as [noncitizens] departing their native countries, incurring expenses traveling to the United States, obtaining housing and means of transport, and building connections in their communities – DHS was required to give a justification for terminating existing grants of parole within 30 days instead of on the original termination dates.” The court also found that, because the parole provision at INA § 212(d)(5)(A) consistently refers in the singular rather than plural to grants of parole, terminations of those parole grants must also be considered on an individual, rather than categorical basis. For these reasons, the court found plaintiffs to be likely to succeed in their claim challenging the parole terminations under the FRN.

The court next discussed the injury plaintiffs would likely suffer in the section on standing and found that irreparable harm is likely absent a stay. In contrast, the court found that a stay of the FRN and parole terminations would not injure the government, as it claimed, by limiting its “ability to pursue its foreign policy goals and to exercise its discretionary powers with respect to immigration.” This is because the court’s order would not govern individuals currently outside of the United States nor extend the current parole grants beyond their dates of expiration. On the other hand, the court found no public interest that justifies forcing individuals granted parole to leave before their original parole expires or declaring that hundreds of thousands of individuals are no longer considered lawfully present. Such action would have cut those individuals off from the ability to work and provide for themselves and their families. The balance of the equities and public interest, the court found, weighs in favor of staying the terminations.

Impact on CHNV Parolees

A number of practitioners have informed CLINIC that their CHNV parolee clients have received individual termination notices in their email inboxes informing them that their CHNV parole statuses have been terminated and that they must depart the country. These clients are wondering if they need to depart from the United States or risk being placed in full or expedited removal proceedings. The clients are also being told by employers that their employment authorization documents are no longer valid and thus their employment must be terminated. For now, practitioners should inform their clients that, at least pending this federal litigation, the termination of the CHNV Parole Program and any individual parole notices sent to parolees via their MyUSCIS account (received via emails) are paused and thus their parole should not be considered terminated. Clients may consider showing a copy of the April 14, 2025, order staying the FRN and individual termination notices to their employers as proof that their parole statuses and employment authorizations continue to be valid. In the meantime, practitioners should explore other options for immigration relief for their CHNV parolee clients, including asylum or adjustment of status based on family petitions or, in the case of Cubans, eligibility for adjustment under the Cuban Adjustment Act. The administration has indicated in other guidance that noncitizens who have timely applied for other forms of immigration relief, such as asylum, should not be prioritized in any enforcement actions. Practitioners are encouraged to stay informed of updates by following the CLINIC website.